While in our country the interest in the events in Ukraine went down again, the debates about what happened to the Russian power in the world do not subside. In that direction, some have rightly begun to analyze and ask whether Russia is a player of geostrategic proportions that can challenge the West and the dominance of the liberal world. But is Russia, in any way, a player that can be a guarantor of stability in the Caucasus region? The latter question is interesting because it is part of an intensified agenda pushing to debunk the Russia myth and take bolder initiatives leading to the erosion of Putin's power and the demilitarization of Russia.

Although I personally think that such ambitions can be dangerous, due to the possible misinterpretation of Putin and the Russian leadership, there are those who believe that these are just inflated balloons and that the erosion of the Russian Federation and the fall of Putin are evident. For this purpose, we will dedicate this and the next column to a more detailed analysis of mistakes, that is, to the skill of outwitting in warfare. If you have already guessed, we will consider the two possible options for the outcome of the counteroffensive of the Ukrainian resistance forces.

First, in this and the next column we will debate from a position that is increasingly dominant that the counteroffensive of the Ukrainian resistance forces is a collapse of Russian military wisdom and a complete failure to synchronize the instruments of power not only in Ukraine but also beyond - to challenge the liberal world and its dominance.

Secondly, unlike many who behind cameras or in closed forums believe that Russia is still a power, but are afraid to say so in order to please someone, in the third column on this topic we will make an analysis from that perspective as well - that all this is a planned scenario and that Russia has the situation in Ukraine under control. These two debates will be the basis on which we will build our position on whether Russia will collapse, and thus the assumption of stability in the Caucasus - something that may be less important to certain structures in the West than the stability of the Balkans. As a follow-up to that, we will also analyze what is actually happening between Armenia and Azerbaijan and what is the role of Russia and what is the role of the United States. The last one is especially important because of Pelosi's visit (and a very important one), not only to Taiwan, but also to the Caucasus, so in that direction, as some have already begun to conspire, that Russia is waiting for the same scenario as the USSR after the "grounding" in Afghanistan. Let's go in order.

Yan Matveev, a Russian, has recently become very popular among analysts from the West, especially because he analyzes from a Russian perspective (he comes from there, lives there and understands the culture from the inside). Among other things, in a guest appearance on one of the local shows that are not part of the state media network, Jan summarized five points that, according to him, are the reason for the collapse of the Russian forces. After we present his summary analyses, all those who follow us on the issue with Ukraine, no matter how immodest it sounds, will recognize that everything, but almost everything, has been said in our forum.

Regardless, according to Matveev, Russia's collapse is the result of the sum of the following shortcomings and challenges. First, poor command and control. Second, catastrophic logistics support or logistics concept.

Third, poor personnel management or timely replacement of forces. Fourth, poor quality in training and, finally (fifth), a large number of tactical errors. To be honest, from this perspective, we have already articulated on several occasions that the Russian forces have a problem in command and control. But what we have failed to see so far, although now from this perspective it was clear on several occasions or there were many indicators that it was so, the armed forces bearing Russian insignia cannot be said to act as an organized formation under a single command. . There is no single parentage in the operative dictionary.

A terribly dangerous indicator for new democracies, even for NATO member countries that have the same problem (about this on another occasion, but with concrete facts). The arguments presented in Matveev's analysis made us go back to our archives (the sources of past texts) to conclude that in the past three months the military forces occupying Ukraine and carrying the Russian flag are not under a single command.

Even the grouping of these forces often brought the occupying forces themselves into latent conflict. In translation, centralized chains of command and the interference of politics in command resulted in a total collapse in the attempt to transform political direction into field operations. In other words, this mess is the result of a dangerous substitution of the management of military resources, budget funds and the principles of civilian control over the armed forces with the leadership and command of the units. Substitution of management and control through mechanisms for that, with guidance-leadership and command. An example, albeit the mildest, of this is when politicians interfere with where and which individual soldier will serve or which part of the battlefield he will be deployed to, not to mention directly deciding on matters in which they are not experts, just because they have the control mechanism.

There have been examples of this in the past in NATO member countries (for example, in the magazine "War on the Rocks" there was an article with a comparative analysis of the challenge that Greece and Taiwan have with the attitude towards the conscripts, I highly recommend it). The next level of conflict is in operational competences and priorities, which are determined not by commanders but by civilians close to Putin. Take the example of the Wagner Formation. Parts of the Russian armed forces are subordinated to them and should support the maneuver or provide air support. For example, the Su-25 planes, which they use for their own needs, are part of the Russian Air Force. There were a series of reports of conflicts between them and the special forces on the ground, which high-ranking Secret Service personnel had to deal with directly on the ground. While there is much to say on this topic, we will simply point out that all of this is disrespectful to the military leaders who are supposed to be leading the operation.

It is true that similar situations happened with the controversial "Blackwater" during the global war on terrorism. But it is also true that after the politician saw that some borders had been crossed, he withdrew and allowed the military experts to do the work on the ground. In that context, for example, when Biden proposed to deliver strategic artillery systems to Ukraine, at the suggestion of military leaders, first of all Miley (the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, and of course US Defense Secretary retired General Lloyd), Biden has not given the green light for such a thing. In contrast, Prigozhny and his Wagner showed, very similar to almost all countries in the region, that if you are close to the surveyor/president you can change commanders. There are many examples. The next group to run are the forces from Luhansk and Donetsk.

Members of these groups with scarce equipment and armaments – part of the disastrous logistics, could often be seen in Kherson, but also in other areas. These forces were rarely synchronized with the regular composition of the ground army of Russia, not to mention the WW of the occupying forces. Rosgvardija – the internal military forces – or the so-called The Russian National Guard, which includes both Chechens and the Special Purpose Knights, is a separate story that is part of this collage. The Ramadan fasts made it clear that the "Tik-Tokers" – a nickname given by Ukrainians to what they interpret as braggarts from Chechnya - further complicates this segmented lineup. Finally, the OMON forces, which are gendarmerie forces intended for public order and peace, similar to the rapid deployment unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in our country or gendarmerie forces around the world, were also present, but they answer to Zolotov, not to the commanders of the field.

Those who participated in the 2001 conflict surely know what we are talking about. To sum up: in relation to this indicator from the analysis, we will say that the Russians have a serious problem with one of the principles of warfare – single leadership and leadership and command. The next problem in the context of the counteroffensive is logistics. We talked a lot about it, but in the next issue we will analyze it in the context of the counteroffensive of the Ukrainian resistance forces.

(The author is a university professor, associate professor at Arizona State University, USA)