(Foreign Affairs)

Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a "partial mobilization" to bolster his surprise war against Ukraine. However, the pretense that there is something partial to this move is as convincing as Putin's claim that Russia is merely conducting a "special military operation" in Ukraine. After Putin's announcement, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said 300.000 men with military training and experience would be called up. But some reports indicate that this is not the figure listed in the official documents authorizing the mobilization, and the parts of Putin's decree that have been made public do not include any restrictions on the Defense Department's subpoena authority. According to some reports, as many as one million men could be drafted, and some military commissariats already appear to be indiscriminately drafting men.

The recruitment marks a dramatic turning point in the war and in Putin's rule. The Kremlin expected the war to be short. When that didn't end quickly, Putin found a way to lead it in a way consistent with the political style he has employed since coming to power in 2000. The few Russians who were enraptured by the imperial promises of war could fly the flag and display the letter "z", the official symbol of war. Those who were frightened or disturbed by the war could quietly hide in obscurity. Those who expressed discontent in public were always punished: thousands were arrested for marching or holding signs that read, among other things, ("no to war") or the phrase "two words", a euphemism for "no to war". No one could go against the government or express dissent in the public sphere. Any organization against the war was strictly prohibited, and violators were severely punished.

This response was not fascism, despite the common application of that term to describe Putin's rule. It was the preservation of an atomized and permissive society that was safely apolitical and would not disturb the activities of the Kremlin. For this state of affairs to continue, the war had to stay away. It had to be a variable abstraction onto which the subjective attitudes of Russians could be projected, whether they were pro-war or anti-war. Polling data shows that, before mobilization, the war had the support of more than 75 percent of Russians. Such acceptance was the best possible public response from the Kremlin's point of view. Indifference was second.

But the war did not go as planned, and Putin was left with no options. If Putin were to withdraw, Ukraine would increase its military strength and further integrate into European and transatlantic institutions, an outcome that would make war perfectly counterproductive and therefore unacceptable to Putin; it would be a Russian defeat. At the same time, Russia cannot win the war with the instruments it currently has. That was proven on September 10, when Ukrainian forces recaptured huge swaths of territory. The Russian army is exhausted and too small to hold all the ground it has captured since February. Without a change in the status quo, Ukraine is likely to continue to make further gains, perhaps even moving on to Crimea, the territory that Russia annexed in 2014 and is closely associated with Putin's legacy.

Russia has had many setbacks in Ukraine, but it is not a defeated country. It has the wealth and population and industrial capacity to sustain the war – but only if it mobilizes. It emphasizes that calling for mobilization is much simpler than carrying it out, something Russia has not done for decades. Even if the military can improve logistics – and the experience of the first days suggests that this is unlikely – mobilization will only be as good as the strategy behind it. Mobilizing for a losing strategy will create more problems for Putin than it will solve. It may even undermine Putin's ability to govern.

At the very least, the mobilization will bring politics back to Russia. It will eat away at the public indifference that has long been key to Putinism. Russia has already seen a wave of protests in response to Putin's announcement last week, with huge numbers of Russians eligible for mobilization heading to the borders soon after Putin announced the plan. Political pressure will come to the Kremlin not only from opponents of the war, but also from those alarmed by the military's staggering incompetence and seeming lack of resolve. The first group has almost no political power. The second, however, has the potential to turn into a challenge for Putin. In the past week, some of the staunchest supporters of Putin and the war have expressed concern that the mobilization campaign appears poorly planned.

To avoid that risk to Putin's power and the threat of major resistance, the Kremlin will have to repress the Russian population much more than it has done before. According to OVD-Info, a Russian human rights organization, over 2.300 anti-war protesters were detained across Russia in the five days after the mobilization was announced. But repression can take on a chaotic momentum of its own. It can generate disgust and rage. Increased repression amid the chaotic mobilization has already sparked unrest in some places, including the burning of mobilization posts. Such incidents could multiply and become difficult for the Russian government to manage.

However, instead of expecting a revolution or a palace coup, the world should prepare for a long war in Ukraine. The crackdown won't necessarily speed up or simplify mobilization, but it will keep the streets quiet and allow Putin to continue his aggression.

The war is coming home

Putin's decision to invade Ukraine in February shocked much of the Russian population. There was a months-long buildup of forces in the border regions, and by January, it became clear that something was brewing. However, it did not appear that the majority of Russians wanted their country to wage war against a neighbor that clearly had no intention of attacking Russia. War was not wanted. But still, she was far from unpopular.

The war serves the primary foreign policy goal that Putin has pursued for more than two decades: asserting Russian sovereignty (as he sees it), particularly over the territories of the former Soviet Union. And none of those territories is more essential than Ukraine. Russian sovereignty does not necessarily mean military action or colonization of Ukraine. But that requires keeping Ukraine in Russia's sphere of influence. Russia would like to write the rules in Ukraine, preferably from a distance, as it tried to do before the Maidan revolution of 2013-2014. One way or another, Moscow wants to be the deciding vote on Ukrainian issues that Putin considers essential for Russia.

The 2022 war is popular as an expression of Russian sovereignty. Supporters see it as a defensive war against a hostile West that has come to Russia's borders, threatening to destroy it. They also see it as a war against "Nazi" Ukrainian nationalist forces that threaten Russians and Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. Such convictions were not limited to the far right or extreme nationalists in Russia; they are widespread. According to this opinion, the West crossed the line in Ukraine. He ignored Russian interests. The United States particularly hurt Russian pride by taking a major role in Ukraine: it seems that Washington was not satisfied with dominating most of Europe, so it had to dominate all of Europe. This alleged American attitude allowed the Kremlin to describe the war in Ukraine as a good war. For the first seven months, the Kremlin mostly asked Russians to support their country in the war, and the vast majority of Russians agreed. That was enough.

And, unlike during the Soviet era, for now there is a valve to release any dissent: the possibility of leaving Russia. Several hundred thousand Russians did just that in the wake of the invasion. Taking their anti-war sentiments with them, they left Russia for professional reasons, for moral reasons, and for fear of what the war might do to Russia. Those who left were almost all educated professionals from urban centers. They had the resources to leave: money, skills, foreign contacts. Some of them, however, eventually had to return because they ran out of work and money.

Outside of Russia, they could say and write whatever they wanted. They could be vehemently against the war. However, with their departure, they were no longer politically present in Russia. The Kremlin can easily dismiss their criticism as unpatriotic. It was an elegant solution to the popularity problem of war. The Kremlin did not have to produce consent so much as manage and maintain it. Dissent was punished – but potential dissenters could simply remove themselves and withdraw from the political scene.

Putin's "chaka" was the barrier he built between war and everyday life. For the vast majority of Russians, the war in Ukraine remained an abstraction, similar to a reality TV show. During the summer, most Russians were able to continue enjoying the good weather and the routines of civilian life. A perfect illustration of this dynamic was the celebration of Moscow Day on September 10, which was held as in peacetime. And why not? Moscow was at peace. Why not have fun? Putin appeared in public, opening a huge Ferris wheel, the largest in Europe, for Muscovites to enjoy. But the war broke the terms of this reassuring narrative. While Putin laughed and Moscow celebrated, Russian forces suffered a massive and humiliating defeat around Kharkiv in Ukraine. (And the Ferris wheel broke almost as soon as it started working.)

Enemies within?

Putin now faces a deadline. He cannot win the war quickly and may not be able to win it at all. He may be able to maneuver towards an outcome he and his country can accept, but that would be a multi-year project. For ordinary Russians, that time will be marked by pain, loss and suffering. War will stifle the pleasures of peace and dampen public enthusiasm. In this regard, Putin could benefit from studying the history of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The war itself did not cause the fall of the Soviet Union, but as more and more families saw their sons returned in body bags, awareness of the losses caused resentment. The war destroyed the legitimacy of the government. Along with many other catalysts, it hastened the fall of the Soviet Union.

The mobilization will make it significantly more difficult for Putin to move around the domestic landscape. He fought many wars as president of Russia, but he was never a military president. He would have to force hundreds of thousands of young men into uniform. The general morale problems associated with conscripts will intersect with the specific morale problems facing the Russian military in Ukraine: poor organization, poor efficiency, high losses and exhaustion.

Putin will also have to mobilize public opinion. Russians will no longer be allowed to keep their distance from the state, giving it impunity and getting privacy in return. Putin has violated the terms of his contract with the people. They will be required to show enthusiasm for the war. Encouraging support for the war and discouraging opposition will be government projects. The Kremlin will not approach this task lightly and will put Putin's ideological sincerity to the test. The ingredients that made up Russian political culture during the Putin era – a complex blend of Soviet, post-Soviet, Imperial Russian and modern Russian elements – will have to be replaced by a cruder, more blatant Russian jingoism. Meanwhile, an increasing number will try to leave the country, avoid military service, or leave the military.

Mobilization will entail suppression of emigration. Before the end of September, it is likely that the borders will be closed to those who meet the requirements for mobilization. Anti-war Russians and those who previously thought they could ignore the war will be stuck at home. The government will use threats or violence to force their silence. A nervous government will have to contend with a potentially combustible, albeit disorganized, protest force. The Kremlin may have to open other fronts of repression, targeting nationalist circles that have been calling for mobilization for months and that can only be appeased by victories on the battlefield, which mobilization may not achieve. Some of these warmongers are prominent political figures. Putin may have to suppress not only street protests and opposition movements, but also cadres who might be willing to consider removing him from power.

There is no going back

Planning for a workable outcome in Ukraine is probably beyond Putin's grasp at this point. The Ukrainian military is too strong for the government in Kyiv to make concessions to Moscow, even if it wants to negotiate an end to the fighting. The war was too brutal for Ukrainians to forgive and forget.

However, Putin will not back down either. He will look for ways to continue the war, which is by no means impossible for him. Mobilization would allow him to introduce new troops into the war and perhaps organize surprise attacks. It could delay the worst consequences of a catastrophic war, although a disorganized mobilization could end up straining the Russian military. The longer the war, the greater the likelihood that an economic collapse in Ukraine or political changes in Europe or the United States could open up opportunities for Russia. It is a dark strategy and in many ways an unlikely strategy, but it is a strategy commensurate with Russia's capabilities.

A sharp intensification of repression is difficult for authoritarian regimes. There is a mysterious point at which increasing repression generates increasing unrest and an unknown point at which revolution begins. However, Putin is a student of Russian history and understands that Russia's tendency toward revolution comes not when the state has power, but when it relinquishes power. Czar Nicholas II abdicated during World War I, after starting a war against Japan that weakened the Russian Empire. The Provisional Government that followed did not have the strength or the will to stop the Bolshevik Revolution. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev is a clearer example of Putin. Gorbachev did not deny Soviet backwardness. He admitted certain mistakes and withdrew from Afghanistan. Through glasnost and perestroika, he transferred power to the peoples of the Soviet Union. But the loosening of Communist Party control sparked a revolution that overthrew the regime. The Soviet Union lacked cohesion and the will to keep itself alive. Putin will not make that mistake. Instead, he will turn to the examples of Czars Nicholas I and Alexander III, and Soviet leaders Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, who were able to suppress dissent at home, keep their subjects in line and fiercely pursue them. line policies without allowing dissent to crystallize into meaningful movements.

Putin has a vast architecture of repression at his disposal. Numerous media outlets have served as government mouthpieces for the past two decades. And since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the remaining non-governmental media have been closed or forced to leave Russia. Putin himself came from the security services, as did many of his colleagues in the Kremlin. He has all the necessary resources to transform Russia into a brutal police state, much more repressive than it is now. It will not bring him genuine support for the war, and perhaps no advantage in warfare. But it will give him a way to rally the Russians in the war effort and severely punish anyone who stands in his way. In waging his war at home, he will be ruthless