Last issue we covered a topic that is not only not understood in these spaces, but is a topic that is not given enough attention – that is the digitization of war. Although there are a bunch of events that talk about digitalization and its benefits, which is certainly commendable, the problem is that these events see war as something that is a special form or from an extremely ultraliberal aspect, which, at least for the time being for Europe, has turned out to be fatally. Make no mistake, no one favors war, nor does it portray it as a social phenomenon that is good. On the contrary, as a phenomenon that is bad, but, unfortunately, is a reflection of humanity, war is a reflection of greed, aggressiveness and all the bad qualities of man, which in the political discourse and narrative are transferred as a necessary evil, as an existential and ultimate measure or as a continuation of politics by other means – use of force and murder.

We will not talk about the legitimization of murders and the contradictions that spew from all sides, not for the bad ones but for the quasi-liberals. Now, as we promised, we will point out how in practice the digital face of war affects conflicts, especially in Ukraine, but also on a global level in the great geostrategic game. To be clear, just look at how much attention the serious world, even the one where we live (the western liberal one, at least with a narrative) pays to technologies that are called by different names, but the most used terms are "dual-use technologies" or "disturbing technologies". Those, my dears, are the technologies that are used to reflect the "competitive" spirit, but they are also a reflection of progress and innovation, through which priority and primacy in economic relations is ensured. These are the technologies that are the essence of something that the "fancy" girls and guys talking about the digitization of these areas point to as the future and the basis for "business continuity" - sustainable business, efficiency, economy or, in one word, the future. These are the technologies that make our life like a movie and with which we trade freedom for services in one way or another. This should in no way be taken to mean that we are against these technologies or the advantages they have proven to offer on every level. On the contrary, this is just a prelude that should show the side of these technologies that is hardly talked about in these spaces, except in the criminal sense and that is mentioned here and there in a magazine, by companies from the country close to former ministers ( for defense, for example) they use and not only use them but also produce them. And we won't talk about the "quasi-journalists", who won't even talk about the miracle that they are friends with the previous ones.

To simplify the conclusion, the need for a debate about these technologies and the digital face of war is precisely in the dual nature, and precisely in the fact that these spaces are not silent observers of the development and application of these technologies. On the contrary, the fact that global elections were developed here and decided from here indicates that the region, as well as the country, has human potential (imperative for the development and application of these technologies) that can mean a lot with a smart approach. However, the neglect of the appropriate approach, especially the dual nature, goes to the detriment of all of us, especially the use of the positive side of these technologies and of course the appropriate arrangement and regulation of their use and use. Just one more thing and we go with how these technologies affect the outcome in Ukraine and are at the center of the geostrategic competition.

The covid-19 crisis has undoubtedly shown that much stronger countries than us have lost the story of digital resilience. If someone is smart in the country, they can recognize the opportunity here. Just one parallel – even though we have "trotted" in the development of mobile telephony or more precisely in the use of radio telephony, the late installation of these technologies made us have a serious advantage over some countries for which it was very expensive to transit from one system to another. It is the same here, but it is not. The digital face of war undoubtedly provides and will yet provide "inputs" that will cause changes in the organizational, but also in the legislative sense for all those who, if they want to maintain their position and dominance in socio-economic relations, will have to do that. Ukraine has shown that innovative technologies or technologies that have a dual role (can be applied for everyday socio-economic benefit but also as a tool for warfare) can reduce the conventional advantage of a far stronger enemy. For example, thanks to the pragmatism of the Ukrainian leadership, the mobilization against the aggressor gained a new dimension. This, unfortunately, has blurred the lines between civilians and combatants, in accordance with the classical principles and standards of the international law of war, which in itself is a problem that will require new solutions that we have already mentioned may also be an opportunity. In any case, the fact that Ukraine has become a laboratory of new technological concepts is beyond doubt.

Although to date much of the information about the war in terms of ingenuity and innovation in warfare is devoted to the effect of the Javelins, or Bajaraktar drones, that is, to how the Space X Starlink satellites helped to coordinate artillery attacks on the aggressor, for the rest of the technologies that they have a dual nature, and we have very little information about their impact on the conflict. To understand the thick preface, however, we will use one of the few examples that are very little talked about in these areas, and which have a significant effect on the war and its outcome. Namely, at the beginning of 2020, the Ukrainian authorities, guided by the digitization trend, introduced the so-called "Diia" app. This application is part of the measures for good governance and the proliferation of the digitalization trend. Among other things, this application was initially supposed to make it easier for citizens to renew their parking permits, to get access permits with vehicles in certain parts and areas of the city, but also to submit complaints and appeals, and even for social activism - inclusiveness in making suggestions for good governance.

The government of Ukraine, with a smart tip, repurposed this app and turned it into the eyes and ears of the resistance forces. Thanks to this application, citizens can send live images and geolocation of enemy force deployment and movement. The images and data, as well as the communication through this application, are used to identify suspected persons involved in treason or as fifth columnists, but also to determine perpetrators of international crimes.

Thanks to the synchronization of the database from the application with military intelligence, Russia almost could not rely on the principle of surprise despite the initial possibility of rapid penetration into the depth of the enemy. In this way, the conflict in Ukraine has done what engineers call a "system upgrade" – a system upgrade. In other words, the first "twitter war" since Israel's military operations in the Gaza Strip since 2012 in the sphere of influence operations in Ukraine has received its own upgrade. However, apart from the tactical-operational sense, the digital face of war is becoming imperative on a strategic level. The race for digitization dominance is particularly hot between the two potential rivals the US and its allies and China in the Indo-Pacific. For now, it is clear to the US that China is an entire generation behind the US in terms of manufacturing capacity and the type of chips that enable certain advanced achievements in digital technologies. But it is also clear to them that time is closing the gap (even if it is generational) not on the side of the United States. Many other factors, starting from the openness of the economy and the liberal market in which the rules are based on a small role of the state in the market dynamics, to the way of arranging the rules of the game, are not on the side of the USA. They favor China. In addition, the quality of the workforce that China has managed to build, as well as the logistics chains for technologies and production.

It is precisely this, together with the race for profit and thus the race for cheap labor, that is the main inhibitor in the attempt to diversify China's option with other regions that are galloping in this sphere. However, this interweaving of things clearly points to the thesis that the digitization process is much more than "fancy talk", because it is "sexy". A fundamental understanding of the interdependence and connection of processes with science and management, to regulation and building appropriate leadership will be the basis of turning the digitization of war from a fear and taboo topic into an opportunity and option that can offer solutions. Just to illustrate, before the New Year Japan clearly understood all this and therefore decided to drastically change the course of investments in defense, among other things, through technology and digitalization. And while this is happening, let us have a happy new year 2023!

(The author is a university professor, associate professor at Arizona State University, USA)